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The Laws › Commandment #370
Commandment #370 · Negative #370

A Woman May Not Have Relations with an Animal

לֹא תִשְׁכַּב אִשָּׁה אֶת בְּהֵמָה
Leviticus 18:23 · Family Laws
וּבְכָל בְּהֵמָה לֹא תִתֵּן שְׁכָבְתְּךָ לְטָמְאָה בָהּ וְאִשָּׁה לֹא תַעֲמֹד לִפְנֵי בְהֵמָה לְרִבְעָהּ תֶּבֶל הוּא
“Do not have sexual relations with an animal and defile yourself with it. A woman must not present herself to an animal to have sexual relations with it; that is a perversion”

The Female Clause in Leviticus 18:23

Leviticus 18:23 contains two distinct prohibitions in a single verse: the first addresses men (#369), and the second — “a woman must not present herself to an animal to have sexual relations with it” — addresses women (#370). The Rambam counts these as two separate commandments (Sefer HaMitzvot, Neg #215 and #216). The male prohibition uses “tumah” (defilement); the female prohibition uses “tevel” (perversion/confusion). The difference in terminology reflects different aspects of the same violation: the male’s act defiles him; the woman’s act confuses the categories of creation.

The Hebrew “tevel” appears only twice in the entire Bible: here, and in Leviticus 20:12 (intercourse with a daughter-in-law). This rare word is reserved for acts the Torah treats as category violations — acts that blur boundaries that creation established as fundamental. The daughter-in-law case blurs the boundary between father-role and husband-role; the bestiality case blurs the boundary between human and animal. Both are described not merely as sins but as confusions of created order.

Leviticus 20 — Equal Consequence for Both Parties

Leviticus 20:16: “If a woman approaches any animal and lies with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them.” The Leviticus 20 penalty chapter specifies the death of both the woman and the animal — the same double consequence as for the man in v.15. The legal treatment is identical for both sexes: same violation, same consequence. The double consequence (woman and animal) follows the same logic as the male case: the animal is put to death not punitively but to remove a reminder of the violation from the community.

The rabbis (Sanhedrin 55a) discuss whether the animal’s death is technically necessary in terms of the animal’s legal status. The conclusion parallels the male case: the animal bears no moral responsibility and is not guilty. Its death is a communal act, not a judicial punishment. This is consistent with the Torah’s broader pattern: the legal framework is not about the animal’s culpability but about the community’s covenant integrity. An animal used in this way has become part of a covenant violation; removing it from the community is a matter of covenant maintenance.

The Woman’s Position in the Holiness Code’s Sexual Ethics

Commandment #370 is one of several places where the Holiness Code explicitly addresses women in the same terms as men within the sexual prohibitions. Leviticus 18:19 prohibits approaching a woman in her ritual impurity. Leviticus 20:10 states that both the adulterer and the adulteress are put to death. Leviticus 20:16 applies the death penalty identically to the woman and the animal. The Holiness Code treats women as full moral agents within the covenant sexual ethics — capable of violation and equally subject to the covenant’s legal consequences.

The phrase in v.23 “a woman must not present herself” (“lo ta’amod”: she shall not stand before) frames the act as the woman initiating the encounter, not merely being acted upon. The active framing — “present herself” — establishes her moral agency. The legal and ethical framework of Leviticus 18–20 does not treat women as passive objects of law but as actors within the covenant system who are responsible for and subject to its terms. Lev 18:24–26: “Do not make yourselves unclean by any of these things” — the “yourselves” is addressed to the entire covenant community.

For reflection and group study
The word 'tevel' appears only twice in the entire Hebrew Bible: Leviticus 18:23 (bestiality) and Leviticus 20:12 (intercourse with a daughter-in-law). In both cases, the Torah identifies an act that crosses a created boundary — human/animal, and father-role/husband-role. What does the Torah's use of a rare, reserved word for these two specific violations suggest about its taxonomy of sin? Is tevel a distinct category from tumah (defilement) or toevah (abomination), and if so, what makes it different?
The Holiness Code treats women as full moral agents — the female bestiality prohibition (Lev 18:23) frames the woman as presenting herself actively, and the same death penalty applies to both sexes (Lev 20:16). Yet rabbinic tradition developed extensive additional frameworks around female agency in other areas of family law. How does the Holiness Code's consistent treatment of women as moral agents in Leviticus 18-20 compare with the broader rabbinic legal tradition's treatment of women in sexual and family law?

Read the source passage in the Torah reader.

Read in the Torah Reader — Leviticus 18:23